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SUMMARY 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 is a old order piece of legislation, 
but gives full recognition to the right to freedom of assembly and expression. 
These rights are entrenched in sections 16 and 17 of the Bill of Rights and enjoy 
a generous interpretation. Section 5 of the Act creates limitations on these rights, 
as the responsible officer of a local authority is allowed to prohibit a gathering 
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the police will not be able to 
prevent traffic disruption, injury or substantial damage to property. Given the fact 
that this limitation serves to protect a compelling state interest, it constitutes a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation in terms of section section 36 of the Bill of 
Rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a radical change in the South African law took place without the fanfare, 
pomp and ceremony accorded to the interim and final Constitutions and some 
other new order legislation, such as the Labour Relations Act. What makes this 
change the more interesting is the fact that the legislation implementing this 
change, was to a large extent a negotiated and cooperative effort by the previous 
government and its most vociferous opponents. 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act1, an old order2 piece of legislation, makes a 
clean break with the legislation and policies of the apartheid government.3 It 
recognizes fundamental rights such as the right to freedom of assembly and 
expression (and to a lesser extent association) in a manner unknown in South 
Africa before the adoption of a bill of rights. 
The aim of this discussion is to evaluate the effect of some of the limitations on 
the freedom of assembly and expression, as imposed by section 5 of the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act. To evaluate these limitations, it is essential to 
introduce the topic by reviewing the new order created by the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act and its effect on police policy regarding gatherings. The main 
purpose of this is that it is necessary to fully understand the rationale behind the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act and its general effect on fundamental rights and 
2 
3 
Act No. 205 of 1993 (as amended). 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act was assented to on 14 January 1994. 
Admittedly under major international and local pressure. 
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police action. 
The second part of the paper will be devoted to a critical evaluation of the 
constitutionality of the mechanisms created by the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
that limits constitutionally entrenched rights, such as the freedom of assembly 
and expression. 
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2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Historically, the position regarding riotous and prohibited gatherings and 
assemblies has been regulated by statute.4 Previously, most gatherings fell into 
one of four categories, namely general gatherings, gatherings at or near Buildings 
4 See "Oproerige Bijeenkomsten en Krimineel Recht Wijzigingswet 1914", 
Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956 and the Internal Security Act, 1982, all 
predecessors of the current statutory provisions. On 15 November 1996 the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act, Act No. 205 of 1993 came into operation 
repealing relevant provisions of the Internal Security Act. 
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of Parliament in Cape Town, at or near the Union Buildings and in or near court 
buildings. For purposes of this discussion, only the position regarding the first 
category will be set out. 
The Internal Security Act 
Section 46 of the notorious Internal Security Act, 1982 boiled down to this: the 
Minister of Law and Order or the magistrate of a district could legally prohibit all 
gatherings that they were convinced were not in the interests of public order. The 
magistrate could also allow a gathering, but place restrictions on the gathering. 
Non-compliance with a prohibition was an offence in terms of section 57. 
The police had certain legal duties in terms of sections 4 7 and 48 of the Internal 
Security Act. Should a warrant officer or officer of higher rank have reason to 
believe that a prohibited gathering would take place, he could close the place or 
area to the public. Entering or remaining in the area was an offence under 
section 57(4). The police also had a legal duty to disperse "illegal" gatherings, 
or gatherings at which participants killed or seriously injured persons or damaged 
valuable property. Section 48 provided for the powers to use the necessary force 
to attain this goal. An oral warning to disperse stating the consequences of a 
failure to disperse, had to precede the use of force. Section 49 provided for 
safety measures, in that the police had to use non-lethal methods of dispersal 
before using weapons likely to cause serious bodily injury or death. The political 
masters of the police expected positive enforcement of these provisions, which 
often resulted in overzealous policing of crowds, sometimes with excessive force. 
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Against this backdrop, the police and participants became increasingly 
adversarial in the application of the Internal Security Act and violence and 
disruption during gatherings became common. During 1991 the then State 
President appointed the Goldstone Commission5 to investigate the phenomenon 
of public violence in the RSA, its nature and causes and persons involved in it. 
The Commission's functions were inter alia to report to the State President and 
to make recommendations on steps to be taken to prevent such violence or 
intimidation. 
The Goldstone Commission 
The Goldstone Commission6 inter alia inquired into the events after the 
assassination and during the funeral of Mr Chris Hani and the events at the World 
Trade Centre, where the AWB stormed the venue of the CODESA negotiating 
process. 
Furthermore, the Commission inquired into the regulation of gatherings and 
marches, to limit disruption and violence as far as possible. A panel of local and 
international experts undertook this inquiry and consulted with interest groups 
such as the African National Congress, the lnkatha Freedom Party, the former 
South African Police, the former South African Defence Force and the 
5 
6 
The Commission was appointed in terms of the Prevention of Public Violence 
Act, Act No 139 of 1991. 
The Goldstone Commission referred to here must not be confused with the 
appointment to investigate the incidents at Sebokeng, Boipatong, Lekoa, 
Sharpeville and Evaton. That Commission was appointed in Proclamation R86 
of 1990 (GN R 1042 of 1990 - Reg Gaz 4494 of 7 May 1990). See in this regard 
Thipanyane "The Goldstone Commission Report" (1990) SACJ 304 for a 
discussion of that report. 
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Department of Justice. After these consultations, the panel produced a report to 
serve as a model for such regulation. 7 
In the Commission's final report on the prevention of public violence and 
intimidation, it referred to an agreement and commented on some aspects.· The 
South African Police, the African National Congress, Cosatu, the South African 
Communist Party and the lnkatha Freedom Party concluded an interim agreement 
on the conduct of public demonstrations.8 The following remark on page 4 of the 
final report is quite interesting: 
4. Oat die Tussentydse Ooreenkoms ten opsigte van Massa-optogte en Betogings 
feitlik deurgaans getrou nagekom is, is bewys van die wyse waarop mense 
hulle gebonde ag aan voorwaardes van 'n ooreenkoms waartoe hulle partye 
was. Die komitee vertrou dat die meerderheid Suid-Afrikaners hierdie 
konsepwetsontwerp in dieselfde lig sal beskou. 9 
This agreement was the basis upon which organizers and the South African 
Police agreed that the South African Police would maintain a low profile during 
the funeral of Mr Chris Hani. Because emotions were running high during that 
phase, the presence of police officials would probably have aggravated the 
situation. The Commission stated in its report that the organizers were supposed 




The report of the panel was published in Heyman (Ed) Towards Peaceful 
Protest in South Africa: Testimony of multinational panel regarding lawful 
control of demonstrations in the Republic of South Africa. (1992) 
A copy of this agreement is contained in the report: "Towards Peaceful Protest 
In South Africa" n7 at 196. 
That the interim agreement regarding mass marches and protests was faithfully 
complied with almost consistently, is proof of the way in which people regard 
themselves bound by the conditions of an agreement to which they are parties. 
The committee trusts that the majority of South Africans will see the Bill in the 
same light. (free translation) 
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however, this was problematic, as the organizers were not able to control the 
crowds, and the police were not able to respond reactively and timeously. 
The final report further points out that agreements should form the foundation of 
any operational planning for a gathering. The report also covered other relevant 
aspects, but the Commission stated unequivocally that political tolerance is a key 
factor in successful management of a crowd. This tolerance was, at the time, 
"sadly lacking". 
The draft Bill 
After publishing a draft Bill, the panel incorporated comments of more than 35 
bodies into further drafts. They also incorporated further comments on these 
drafts where feasible. The resultant Regulation of Gatherings Act10 is therefore 
a truly cooperative and negotiated effort and serves as an essential instrument 
in the maintenance of public order. 
2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ACT 
The safety triangle 
An essential element of the Act is the creation of a so called "safety triangle" - the 
appointment of a convener of a gathering, a responsible officer of the local 
authority and the authorized member of the South African Police Service. These 
10 The Act was amended by the Safety Matters Rationalization Act, Act No. 90 of 
1996. 
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three parties are the main role players and form a "partnership" to manage the 
event. 
Procedures and mechanisms 
The Act provides that the convener must give notice to the local authority, 11 
whereafter negotiations take place between the members of the "safety triangle" 
and other interested parties.12 Conditions may be imposed by the responsible 
officer for the holding of the gathering, and a gathering may also be prohibited in 
limited and specified circumstances.13 Review and appeal procedures are 
created14 and provisions regarding the conduct of gatherings and demonstrations 
are set out.15 The Act describes police powers to protect participants and non-
participants, provides a framework for the use of force by the police 16 and creates 
liability for organizers for riot damage.17 The Regulation of Gatherings Act 










s3. In Northern Ireland and the Netherlands, a notice is also sufficient (n7 at 
72 and 97); a licence is required in Israel (n7 at 79); a permit in Columbia USA 
(n7 at 92); no notice whatsoever in Germany (n7 at 94); in Belgium the local 










Purpose of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
One of the purposes of the Regulation of Gatherings Act is clearly not only to 
preserve and promote freedom of assembly and expression, but also to protect 
the rights of non-participants. This objective is also of overriding concern and the 
rights of non-participants should be taken into account when any negotiations with 
conveners are conducted and conditions are imposed upon the event. The 
preamble makes it clear that the Regulation of Gatherings Act is aimed at 
promoting the exercise of fundamental rights, with due regard to the rights of 
participants and non-participants alike.20 
2.3 CHANGES EFFECTED BY THE ACT 
Some interesting changes effected by the Regulation of Gatherings Act are the 
shift in approach, the shift in responsibility and police powers. 
The new approach to crowd management 
From the Act, it is quite apparent that the emphasis has shifted from crowd 
control to crowd management. This paradigm shift is also reflected in the South 
20 The preamble reads: 
Whereas every person has the right to assemble with other persons and to 
express his views on any matter freely in public and to enjoy the protection of 
the State while doing so; 
And whereas the exercise of such right shall take place peacefully and with due 
regard to the rights of others ... 
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African Police Service Policy on Crowd Management.21 The new approach 
acknowledges the rights of the individual to express him or herself, associate with 
others and to gather or demonstrate. It also gives effect to these rights by 
promoting state protection in the exercise of these rights. Whereas, in the past, 
the police were deployed to control crowds, the Act and policy promote co-
ownership of the event and co-management thereof by the local authorities, 
organizers and the police. The local authority and the convener play a major part 
in the planning of the gathering, while the convener is involved in the actual 
control and management of the crowd. 
The shift in responsibility 
In the past, magistrates had the responsibility to approve gatherings, marches, 
rallies etc. The police played a major role in advising the magistrate and this 
advice was often based on political intolerance. This situation was clearly an 
obfuscation of the role of the magistrate as it is an executive government function 
and ought not to be a function performed by judicial officers.22 The Act 
recognises the fundamental rights associated with public protest and 
demonstration and shifts this responsibility to the local authority as an organ of 
21 
22 
The Crowd Management Policy was approved of by the Ministers' Forum 
shortly after the Regulation of Gatherings Act came into operation. 
Section 165(1) of the Constitution clearly states that the courts are vested with 
judicial authority - an indication of the intended separation of power. Section 
165(3) requires of other organs of the state to assist and protect the courts to 
ensure independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness. In 
Northern Ireland (n7 at 73), Israel (n7 at 81) and Columbia (n7 at 93), this 
function is usually performed by police officials, while in the Netherlands (n7 at 
97) and Belgium (n7 at 99) the local mayor performs this function. In Zambia, 
this function is performed by the police - see The South African Law 
Commission Final Report on Group and Human Rights 1994 at 48. 
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the state. 
This not only promotes tolerance and accountability, but also ensures that the 
process is transparent. According to the procedures created by the Act, the local 
authority is the axis around which successful implementation of the Act revolves, 
thereby bringing the community closer to the democratic decision-making 
process. Local authorities will therefore ultimately be responsible to the electorate 
in the exercise of this function of government. 
In the past, control of a crowd was a police function. The Act now shifts this 
responsibility to the convener, who must appoint "marshals" to control the crowd 
and ensure compliance with the negotiated aspects as well as the law. This is 
a positive shift in responsibility as the participants are more likely to adhere to the 
orders from their own officials on the one hand, and officials of the organization 
are more likely to be tolerant of their own supporters on the other. 
Police powers 
Section 9 of the Act provides for police powers. The police may exercise these 
powers whether the gathering is held in compliance with the Act or not. The Act 
therefore recognises that the distinction between a "legal" and "illegal" gathering 
has faded considerably when policing of that gathering is at issue. This is 
because legality and situational appropriateness lie at the core of police action. 
Spontaneous gatherings will therefore be policed in the same manner as regular 
gatherings where the organiser has given proper and timeous notice. The only 
"illegal" gatherings will be those prohibited in, or by authority of the Act. 
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The focus of police powers is more concentrated towards negotiation than the 
past strong handed tactics. Predictability and tolerance are promoted. 
The circumstances in which the police may use force to disperse crowds are very 
clear and the use of lethal force only permitted in extreme situations. Dispersal 
does not therefore depend upon the "legality" or "illegality" of a gathering, but 
rather upon the circumstances. This is more in line with the common law 
principles of self-defence, necessity and duty of care.23 
Safety valves 
The safety valves built into the Regulation of Gatherings Act are contained in 
section 6. This section allows the role players in the safety triangle to call on the 
judiciary to review bad administrative decisions and for interested parties to apply 
to court for the appropriate relief. 
2.4 THE EFFECT ON POLICING 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act did not only have a profound effect on policing, 
but more importantly, influenced the policy behind policing. The Crowd 
Management Policy of the South African Police Service rests on four key 
principles: 
23 The common law principle of duty of care, as confirmed in Minister van Polisie 
v Ewels 1975 3 SA 589 (A) was, in my view, extended by the inclusion of 
section 12(1)(c) in the Constitution. The police will, therefore have a positive 
duty of care towards all people. 
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Legality 
Before the police undertake any action, the operational commander will ask 
whether he or she has any legal authority to intervene. In other words, whether 
the police has the necessary mandate. Because the Constitution, the South 
African Police Service Act24 and the Regulation of Gatherings Act (especially 
section 9) create a clear framework for police action, it is necessary for the police 
to recognize the parameters of this legal framework in order to act lawfully. The 
authority to intervene and the restrictions on such intervention must be clear to 
the police before they take any measures. 
Situational appropriateness 
This second principle requires of the police to assess a particular situation to be 
able to respond within the framework of legality. The prevailing circumstances 
of a specific situation will guide the police in deciding which actions to take. 
This principle gives effect to the notion that every situation where a crowd needs 
to be managed, will be different and that operational decisions should be based 
on the actions of the crowd rather than prescribed procedures. 
24 Act No. 68 of 1995, more specifically see section 13(1) that reads: 
Subject to the Constitution and with due regard to the fundamental rights of every 
person, a member may exercise such powers and shall perform such duties and 
functions as are by law conferred on or assigned to a police official. 
See also section 13(3) which requires reasonableness and the use of minimum 
force in the performance of official duties. 
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Optimization 
The principle of optimization concerns the optimal use of equipment and 
personnel to reach or obtain the goal set out in the planning phase. The optimal 
use of equipment and personnel should be possible when a complete analysis is 
made ofthe particular situation. This analysis entails the consideration and study 
of all factors which could possibly influence the effective achievement of suitable 
action to contain the situation. 
Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality concerns the relationship between the means the 
police apply during a public order situation, and the end sought to be achieved. 
The police should suitably equip members according to the circumstances before 
they are deployed. Already during the planning phase, the police should 
determine which methods and equipment may be regarded as least forceful in the 
circumstances. When the use of force is unavoidable, it must cease immediately 
once police members attain the objective of the operation. 25 
Comments on the Crowd Management Policy 
The Crowd Management Policy actively defines and promotes the purpose of the 
25 This objective will normally be to maintain public order, to prevent injury or 
death to persons, or prevent damage to property. It thus relates to the duty of 
care of the police. 
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Regulation of Gatherings Act. Read with the Act, the Crowd Management Policy 
forms a framework within which the police can define their powers. It thus 
prevents arbitrary police action, the overzealous use of force and violent dispersal 
of "illegal" gatherings. 
The Crowd Management Policy clearly reflects aspects of the 1996 Constitution 
by acknowledging fundamental rights and promoting an approach consistent with 
section 36(1 ): 
o The principle of legality requires a clear legal framework justifying 
intervention by the police. 
o The principle of situational appropriateness is in line with the requirement 
of section 36 that limitation of a fundamental right must be reasonable and 
justifiable and that all factors must be taken into account. 
o The principle of proportionality requires that the police consider the 
purpose of the limitation, its nature and extent as well as the relationship 
between the limitation and its purpose. This process should logically lead 
to a decision to use the least forceful (restrictive) methods to attain the 
lawful goal of maintaing public order. 
2.5 PROHIBITION 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act also effects the prohibition of gatherings and 
demonstrations. It provides for two types of prohibition of gatherings or 
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demonstrations. The first of these is an ab initio prohibition in section 7.26 This 
type of prohibition is generally accepted in other countries. The second type of 
prohibition is issued by the responsible officer of a local authority. It is this 
category of prohibition that will be evaluated below. 
Power of a local authority to prohibit a gathering 
In stark contrast with the previous position, the Regulation of Gatherings Act limits 
the power to prohibit a gathering. The only sections dealing with local authority 
prohibitions are section 3(2) and section 5. Section 3(2) enables the local 
authority to prohibit a gathering when the necessary notice is received less than 
48 hours before the event. Section 5 allows for a prohibition the circumstances 
set out below. A responsible officer may not prohibit any gathering arbitrarily, 
even if there are some grounds to feel that a prohibition may save the day. 
26 The section prohibits gatherings at or near courts, buildings of Parliament and 
the Union Buildings. This prohibition is, however, not absolute, as conveners 
may obtain written permission from the relevant authority. This permission can 
obviously only be refused to protect a compelling state interest and the decision 
would have to comply with section 33 of the Constitution regarding 
administrative justice. I submit that the factors provided for in section 36(1) 
should also be considered when exercising this discretion. 
Page 17 
THE EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON PROHIBITION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................ 17 
3.2 DEFINING THE RIGHT AND DETERMINING THE SCOPE ............... 20 
The Constitution: Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
The Constitution: Interpretation ..................................... 21 
The Constitution: Fundamental rights ................................ 21 
The fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and expression: 
the context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
3.3 UNDERSTANDING THE LAW IN FORCE ............................. 25 
Credible information on oath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
A threat of serious disruption of traffic, injury or damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
That the police or traffic officers will not be able to contain this threat . . . . . . . 27 
Meet with or consult the interested parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Convinced on reasonable grounds that no amendment or 
condition will prevent the threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
3.4 DOES SECTION 5 CONSTITUTE A PRIMA FACIE INFRINGEMENT? ...... 30 
Prior restraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
3.5 IS THIS A CONSTITUTIONALLY TENABLE LIMITATION? ............... 31 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The dawning of a constitutional dispensation has a profound effect on the 
implementation of the Regulation of Gatherings Act and defines the frame of 
reference within which it must be viewed. It is therefore prudent to define the 
rights in question and determine their scope, before discussing a limitation of 
these rights by the Regulation of Gatherings Act. 
Contrary to the literal interpretation favoured by the South African courts before 
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the interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court has accepted that, in interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, a purposive and generous approach should be adopted.27 It is, 
however, necessary to distinguish between "purposive" and "generous" within 
such an approach, as a purposive approach does not necessarily embrace 
generosity.28 Du Plessis and Corder argue convincingly that the "purposive" 
approach could better be described as "purpose-seeking". According to Du 
Plessis and Corder, this means that 
. .from the point of view of ascertaining the ratio Jegis, teleological interpretation is part 
of a contextual approach which also includes grammatical29 , systematic30, historical31 , 







S v Zuma 1995 4 BCLR 401 (CC) at411C-G; see also S v Makwanyane 1995 
6 BCLR 665 (CC) at 676 where the approach is described as "generous" and 
"purposive", giving expression to the underlying values of the constitution, while 
paying due regard to the language. 
This distinction needs to be drawn clearly. See Hogg "Interpreting the Charter 
of Rights: Generosity and justification" 1990 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 818 
at 820-1 where he argues that the purpose of the right will determine the 
generosity afforded to its interpretation. See also Du Plessis & Corder 
Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) at 85, where they 
argue that most rights will normally be construed generously. 
See S v Zuma (supra n27) at 412F-H where Kentridge AJ discusses the 
grammatical method. In Kalla v The Master1995 1 SA 261 (TPD) Van Dijkhorst 
J emphasizes this method at 268G-H: 
Obviously, when one seeks to interpret the fundamental rights clauses of chap 
3 thereof, which sets out broad principles, this has to be done in the spirit of the 
Constitution, But surely not when one has to determine whether Bloemfontein 
is the seat of the Appellate Division as provided for in s 106(2)? 
See the judgement of Chaskalson Pin S v Makwanyane (supra n27). The 
approach adopted by Chaskalson P corresponds to a large extent with what Du 
Plessis and Corder refer to as "systematic interpretation". (n28 at 73) 
See S v Zuma (supra n27) at 411 E-F where the historical aspect is addressed. 
See S v Makwanyane (supra n27) at 686A-B where Chaskalson P recognizes 
that foreign and comparative law may be of value to deal with certain issues, 
but are also relevant to section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution. 
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The approach of Ou Plessis and Corder have some advantages and cannot be 
faulted.33 Against this backdrop, the authors propose the following elements of 
interpretation:34 
o defining the rights or entitlements entrenched in the Constitution and 
determining their scope; 
o understanding the law in force (legislation and common law) or the 
administrative action subordinate to the Constitution and this includes -
33 
34 
construing "ordinary" legislation and interpreting applicable 
common and customary law so as to determine their scope 
and effect, and/or 
comprehending the effects of administrative action; 
The purposive approach and the contextual approach both fall into one broad 
category as opposed to the textual or literal approach category. See Botha 
Wetsuit/eg, 'n lnleiding vir studente 1991 11-15. See also Cachalia, Cheadle, 
Davis, Haysom, Maduna and Marcus Fundamental Rights in the New 
Constitution 1994at121; Spitz "Eschewing silence coerced by law: the political 
core and protected periphery of freedom of expression" (1994) SAJHR 301 at 
303; The South African Law Commission Final report on Group and Human 
Rights (1994) at 178. These authors all prefer a purposive or contextual 
approach. The approach of Du Plessis and Corder differs in some respects. 
They prefer to group the five methods named above together to form their 
method of interpretation. This approach has the advantage that the text is 
interpreted with reference to the linguistic exposition thereof, the context and 
purpose of the provision as well as the historical and international context of the 
provision.(n28 at 73-74) The weight accorded to each of these is determined 
by the nature of the statute.(n28 at 66) This method provides a sound basis for 
a holistic interpretation, and is therefore preferred. 
n28 at 72. 
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o determining whether law in force or administrative action prima facie limits 
rights or entitlements entrenched in the Constitution; 
o adjudicating the constitutionality (ie the constitutional tenability or 
justifiability) of any limitation above. 
The grammatical, systematic, teleological, historical and comparative methods 
then serve as a backdrop against which these elements are invoked. 
The relevant sections of the Constitution must therefore be looked at to define the 
right to freedom of assembly and expression, and to determine their scope. 
3.2 DEFINING THE RIGHT AND DETERMINING THE SCOPE 
In order to properly define the right to freedom of assembly and also that of 
expression, it is necessary to examine the application and interpretation of the 
Constitution, as well as some of the most relevant rights entrenched in Chapter 
2. A proper definition of any right is impossible without due regard to its context. 
The Constitution: ApplicatiOn 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa35 provides in the preamble that 
the Constitution is adopted to: 
... lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based 
35 Act 108 of 1996 - referred to as "the 1996 Constitution" 
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on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law; .. 
It further provides in section 7(2): 
7 (2). The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill 
of Rights. 
And in section 8(1 ): 
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 
The Constitution: Interpretation 





When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
must consider international law; and 
may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
The Constitution: Fundamental rights 
The relevant rights are contained in sections 16, 17 and 18: 
Freedom of expression 




freedom of the press and other media; 
freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
freedom of artistic creativity; and 
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to -
(a) propaganda for war; 
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or 
c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender, or 
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religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
Assembly demonstration, picket and petition 
17. Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to demonstrate, to picket and 
to present petitions. 
Freedom of association 
18. Everyone has the right to freedom of association. 
These rights are not absolute, as they may be limited, not only in terms of their 
own internal limitations or modifiers,36 but also in terms of section 36.37 
The fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and expression: The 
context 
Freedom of thought and speech ... is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly 




Carpenter "Internal Modifiers and other qualifications in bills of rights - some 
problems of interpretation" 1995 SAPL 260 expresses misgivings about the way 
in which the interim Constitution was worded. Many of these problems were not 
addressed in the final Constitution. 
Besides the limitation clause, the right to freedom of assembly must obviously 
also be interpreted with regard to the phrase "peacefully and unarmed", which 
is an internal modifier further limiting this right. See infra for a discussion 
regarding s36. 
The famous statement by Justice Cardozo in Palko v Connecticut 302 US 319 
(1937); also quoted by Devenish "Freedom of expression: the 'marketplace of 
ideas"' 1995 TSAR442 at443 n15; Marcus "Freedom of expression under the 
Constitution" 1994 SAJHR 140; Van Schalkwyk Jin Mandela v Falati 1994 4 
BCLR 1 (W) at 7F. Compare this with S v Makwanyane (supra n27) where 
Chaskalson P finds at 722H-723B that 
[t]he rights to life and human dignity are the most important of all human rights, 
and the source of all other personal rights in Chapter 3. By committing 
ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are 
required to value these two rights above all others. 
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In a decision of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in In re Munhumeso 39 the court 
found that freedom of expression serves four broad purposes:40 
o It helps the individual to obtain self-fulfilment; 
o It assists in the discovery of truth; 
o It strengthens the capacity of an individual to participate in decision-
making; and 
o It provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a 
reasonable balance between stability and social change. 
This approach favours the view that 
... the final end of the State was to make men [sic] develop their faculties .. 41 
Freedom of speech is therefore not only the means to the lofty ideal of self-





1995 1 SACR 352 (ZS); see also Retrofit (PVT) v Posts and 
· Telecommunications Corporation 1996 1 SA 847 (ZS) where the court, not 
surprisingly, referred to this statement with approval. 
Thereby recognising the theory of Emerson TM "Toward a General Theory of 
the First Amendment" (1963) Yale Law Journal 877 as quoted in Bums Media 
Law (1990) 42 n1. 
Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927) 375. 
In Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins 1997 4 BCLR 562 (C) Davis AJ describes the 
freedom of expression at 5681 as "a central value of our constitutional 
enterprise." 
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expression is seen as one of the pillars of a democracy - gatherings and 
demonstrations are often used as the means to convey ideas and messages. 
This interdependence between the right to freedom of expression and that of 
assembly, is a clear indication that freedom of assembly is to be regarded as 
important as that of expression and (sometimes inseparably) linked to it. 
Freedom of the media is seen in a similar light.43 Freedom of assembly was 
recognized in the South African law even before the bill of rights entrenched it.44 
It is, however, important to keep in mind that section 16 defines the freedom of 
expression more narrowly than it is defined in countries such as the USA.45 
Besides the internal limitations contained in section 16(2) of the 1996 
Constitution, section 36 also provides for further statutory limitations. Freedom 
of expression in terms of the 1996 Constitution therefore does not enjoy the same 
scope as it did in terms of the 1993 Constitution. 
Our Constitutional Court adopted the approach to define a right generously, and 
to interpose any constitutionally justifiable limitations only at the second stage of 





Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Umited 1996 6 BCLR 836 (W) at 855E-F, which 
is also applicable to the right to gather and demonstrate. 
In During NO v Boesak and Another 1990 3 SA 661 (A) 673 the Appeal Court 
per Grosskopf JA held the view that the right to hold a gathering is regarded as 
one of the fundamental rights in our society. 
The right to freedom of expression was defined more broadly the 1993 
Constitution. Section 15(1) had a striking resemblance to article 21 of the 
Namibian Constitution. The limitations placed on freedom of expression by 
section 16(2) would therefore probably prevent a similar result such as that 
reached by the Namibian High Court in S v Smith 1997 1 BCLR 70 (Nm). 
S v Zuma (supra n27) at 414; S v Makwanyane (supra n27) at 707. Quoting 
from Attorney-General v Moagi 1982 2 Botswana LR 124 at 184, Kentridge AJ 
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be construed generously, because it is regarded as one of the foundations of 
democracy.47 
In Acting Superintendent-General of Education of Kwazulu-Natal v Ngubo and 
Others48 , Hurt J found that the right to assemble and demonstrate 
... implicitly extends no further than is necessary "to convey the (demonstrator's) 
message". I do not consider that there is any basis for concluding that the implicit limits 
of the right to assemble and demonstrate are any more extensive than those of the 
right to freedom of speech and expression. It follows that I cannot conceive of any 
situation where the right to assemble and demonstrate can be so extensive as to justify 
harassment, "tortuous actions" or criminal actions.49 
This dictum defines the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly 
in the South African context - especially in view of the wording of section 16(2). 
From the above it is clear that the right itself ought to be given a generous 
interpretation, but within the parameters of its purpose and text. 




stated in his judgement in S v Zuma at 412H-I that 
a constitution "embodying fundamental rights should as far as its language 
permits be given a broad construction." (My emphasis) 
Cachalia et al n33 at 57. See also the report of the South African Law 
Commission n33 at 47 where it is stated that the general rule will favour 
protection of freedom of expression, its restriction is the exception. 
1996 3 BCLR 369 (N) at 3751. 
At 3751-376A. 
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Section 3(2) and section 5 authorize the responsible officer of a local authority to 
prohibit a gathering. Section 3(2) provides that a responsible officer may prohibit 
a gathering, if the convener gives notice less than 48 hours before the 
commencement of the gathering. 
Section 5(1) and (2) is more specific about the jurisdictional facts that must 
precede a prohibition and reads as follows: 
5(1) When credible information on oath is brought to the attention of a responsible 
officer that there is a threat that a proposed gathering will result in serious 
disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, injury to participants in the gathering 
or other persons, or extensive damage to property, and that the Police and 
traffic officers in question will not be able to contain this threat, he shall 
forthwith meet or, if time does not allow it, consult with the convener and the 
authorized member, if possible, and any other person with whom, he believes, 
he should meet or consult, including the representatives of any police 
community consultative forum in order to consider the prohibition of the 
gathering. 
5(2) If, after the meeting or consultation referred to in subsection (1), the responsible 
officer is on reasonable grounds convinced that no amendment contemplated 
in section 4(2) and no condition contemplated in section 4(4)(b) would prevent 
the occurrence of any of the circumstances contemplated in subsection (1), he 
may prohibit the proposed gathering. 
It is obvious that five jurisdictional facts must exist, before a responsible officer 
may prohibit a gathering:50 
Credible information on oath 
50 The decision to prohibit the holding of a gathering will be subject to section 33 
of the 1996 Constitution regarding just administrative action. Section 33(1) and 
(2) must be read with item 23(1) of Schedule 6. See also para 82 of the 
judgement in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) at 12900-F, which will apply by analogy to 
section 33. 
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The Responsible Officer must have "credible information on oath" brought to her 
attention, in order to initiate a prohibition. I would submit that "credible" means 
that the statement must be, objectively speaking, worthy of belief.51 This 
information may contain hearsay evidence, as long as it is reasonably convincing. 
The responsible officer may obviously rely only on information that is not only 
reasonable, but also relevant.52 I would further submit that oral evidence, on oath, 
will also satisfy this requirement. 
A threat of serious disruption of traffic, injury or damage 
The information above must be credible and show that a threat of serious traffic 
disruption, injury to people or extensive damage to property will result if the 
gathering is held. The information must also identify the threat and provide 
sufficient reasons for anticipating it. It is not necessary to prove that the threat is 
actually going to materialise, as the section indicates a standard of proof that is 
far less than reasonable doubt - rather along the lines of a balance of probability 
test. 
That the police or traffic officers will not be able to contain this threat 
Besides furnishing reasons for anticipating a threat, the police (or traffic officers) 




See Baxter Administrative Law 1984 at 501 where the author refers to 
"substantial" or "reasonable" evidence. 
Baxter describes this requirement as "universally appropriate". See n51 at 503. 
This is clear from the word "and" that links the two requirements. 
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may be a valid argument, as will the lack of time to plan and prepare properly. 
Another aspect may also be the sheer magnitude of the event. 54 
An interesting Catch-22 is created by this provision. In terms of section 6(6)(a) 
the police must make the venue inaccessible in the event of a prohibition. In 
other words, to obtain a prohibition, the police must, in terms of section 5(1 ), first 
provide evidence under oath that they cannot contain a certain threat. As soon 
as the gathering is prohibited, they must effectively stop the gathering from taking 
place with that same limited capacity! 
Meet with or consult the interested parties 
After the first two facts are established, the responsible officer must meet or 
consult with the convener and the authorized member or other interested parties 
to consider a prohibition.55 This meeting or consultation is obviously intended to 
provide parties with an interest, such as the convener, an opportunity to present 
facts to persuade the responsible officer to exercise her discretion along certain 
lines - in other words the rules of natural justice, such as the audi alteram partem 




In the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the violence and occurrences 
at Eldorado Park, Westbury, Reiger Park and Noordgesig on 6 February 1997, 
Justice Froneman remarked at 32 of the typed report upon the inability of the 
police to deal with certain situations, not because of the size of the crowd, but 
due to unique factors that may present themselves only on that day. 
The responsible officer must consult. Non compliance with this requirement is 
fatal and any decision taken may be set aside on review. See OVS Vereniging 
vir Staatsondersteunde Sko/e v Premier Prov. Vrystaat 1996 2 BCLR 248 (0) 
at275C-D. 
The rules of natural justice can be incorporated in a general duty to act fairly. 
See Baxter n51 at 540; Jenkins v Government of the RSA 1996 8 BCLR 1059 
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"Consider'' implies that the merits of the issue should be weighed up objectively57 
- the Responsible Officer will therefore be obliged to: 
o act in good faith;58 
o take alternatives into account;59 
o weigh up the consequences of prohibiting or not prohibiting the proposed 
gathering;50 and 
o take a course of action that is reasonable, or "adequately just or right".61 
Convinced on reasonable grounds that no amendment or condition will 






(Tk) at 1068B; Cekeshe v Premier Prov Eastern Cape 1997 12 BCLR 17 46 (Tk) 
at1769E-1770G and the authorities quoted there. Wiechers Administratiefreg 
1984 at 257 sees the rules of natural justice as a tool to ensure that the 
administrative organ applies her mind to the issue properly. See also Kotze v 
Minister of Health 1996 3 BCLR 417 (T) at 426B-C where the court found that 
fairness dictates that the administrative organ should afford the party affected 
by its decision the opportunity to deal with information intended to be taken into 
account when considering the application, but does not form part of the 
application. 
Baxter n51 at 539. 
See Durban Rent Board v Edge mount Investments Ltd 1946 AD 962 at 97 4 -
as also quoted by Baxter n51 at 505. Wiechers n56 at 287 states that all 
administrative acts are subject to the requirement of bona fides. 
Baxter n51 at 538 
The result or consequences of an administrative action must not be 
unreasonable or unfair. See Baxter n51 at 522 and Wiechers n56 at 275. 
Kotze v Minister of Health (supra n56) at 425F. 
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Before the Responsible Officer may prohibit the gathering, she must be 
convinced on reasonable grounds that no negotiated amendment to the notice (i 
e pertaining to the venue, route, time, date, etc) or condition will prevent the 
occurrence of the circumstances relating to the threat. The test is obviously 
objective - the decision must be based on objectively ascertainable facts. This 
requirement is designed to prevent arbitrary decisions and will probably be the 
basis of most applications for judicial review. 
Commentary 
The section as a whole clearly aims at ensuring that the responsible officer does 
not take arbitrary decisions relating to a prohibition. I would argue that the 
decision to prohibit in terms of section 3(2) must ex consequentibus follow the 
same procedure, although it is not so specified.62 
3.4 DOES SEC 5 CONSTITUTE A PRIMA FACIE INFRINGEMENT? 
Prohibition of a gathering effectively means that the means of getting a message 
across, is taken away. Prohibition of a gathering may therefore be likened to 
censorship. 
Prior restraint 
62 As the purpose of the Act is rather to facilitate the exercise of the right to 
freedom of assembly and expression, one would assume that the authority to 
prohibit is limited. The effect of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution would be 
to impose a duty of fairness on the local authority. 
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In the United States of America a limitation of this sort, would certainly be seen 
as a form of prior restraint,63 and as a result subject to a rebuttable presumption 
of unconstitutionality.64 In South Africa a broad range of censorship provisions 
existed at the end of 1989, that had the effect of prior restraint.65 In South African 
law this aspect was discussed by Van Schalkwyk J in Mandela v Falati 66 where 
the learned judge held that 
... a prior restraint would not, save in exceptional circumstances, prevail against the 
right of free speech. 
Since 1989 the political situation has changed drastically, especially with the 
introduction of the Regulation of Gatherings Act and the Constitution. Some 
South African authors regard the right to freedom of assembly as equal to the 
right to freedom of expression.67 Seen in the light of the generous formulation of 
the freedom of expression in the 1996 Constitution, one cannot but agree. In the 
light of past restrictive practices and the values that underlie the Constitution, the 







Cantwell v Connecticut 310 US 296 (1940). At 306 the US Supreme Court held 
that: 
A statute authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the guaranteed 
freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one 
providing for like restraint by administrative action. 
Devenish n38 at 452 and the authorities quoted there. To justify the restraint, 
the executive must prove a "clear and present danger'' . 
Marcus "Censorship under the emergency" 1990 SAHRLL Y 24 at 24. At 33-4 
he gives an overview of prohibitions of gatherings during that period. 
n38. Also quoted and discussed in Spitz n33 at 321. 
Cachalia et al n33 at 57. 
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3.5 IS THIS A CONSTITUTIONALLY TENABLE LIMITATION? 
The Constitution provides as follows: 
Limitation 
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including-
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
The Constitutional Court remarked as follows: 
Although section 36(1) differs in various respects from section 33 of the interim 
Constitution its application still involves a process, described in S v Makwanyane and 
Another as the 'weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based 
on proportionality ... which calls for the balancing of different interests. 68 
The rights in question, are both core fundamental rights, as was shown above. 
On the other hand, the state has a compelling interest, not only in ensuring the 
rights of non participants, but also in ensuring the safety and security of the 
people.69 It is therefore clear that the state has a compelling interest to protect. 
68 
69 
Per Ackermann J in De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 7 BCLR 779 (CC) 
at 816B-C. 
See, for instance, section 12(1)(c) which places a positive duty on the state to 
safeguard the safety and security of every person. See also Towards peaceful 
protest n7 (supra) at 2 regarding the role of police to prevent violent mass 
actions. 
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The nature of the limitation is such that it would only be in extreme circumstances 
that a responsible officer can prohibit a meeting. Under section 5 of the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act it would virtually be impossible to prohibit the 
holding of a gathering arbitrarily. The purpose of section 5 is to ensure the safety 
and security of everyone, not to prohibit the holding of gatherings because they 
are a nuisance. The purpose is achieved with the least infringement on the right 
to freedom of speech and assembly. 
Cachalia et al70 indicate that the right to assembly is always qualified in public 
international law. The right may, according to the authors, be restricted provided 
the restrictions are necessary in a free and democratic society and in the interests 
of public safety, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 71 
Section 39(1)(b) requires of a court, tribunal or forum, when interpreting the bill 
of rights, to consider international law. Section 39(1 )(c) provides that such a 
court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign case law. The 1996 Constitution 
therefore makes it clear that international law and foreign case law will play some 
role in interpreting the scope and application of fundamental rights. The extent 
to which such factors will influence a court is limited in an enquiry regarding the 
70 
71 
n33 at 57. 
Ibid. The authors quote s21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; s11 (2) of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms; and s11 of the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights. In India the state can only make regulations to facilitate the 
right of assembly, and can therefore impose reasonable restrictions to 
safeguard the rights of citizens and to preserve public order. See The South 
African Law Commission n33 at 56 where they quote Himat Lal K Shah v 
Commissioner of Police (1973) 1 SCR 227 (Supreme Court of India). The same 
judgement is quoted in Cachalia et al. 
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rights to freedom of assembly and expression, as the 1996 Constitution limits the 
application of these rights. Although the 1996 Constitution did not apply to the 
parties, the High Court in Acting Superintendent-General of Education of 
Kwazulu-Natal v Ngubo72 found foreign articles and judgements to be "a morass 
of words" rather than helpful. On the other hand, considering international law 
and foreign case law may be extremely helpful to a court. An example of this is 
the exposition by Friedman J in Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana73• I 
submit that the extent to which international law will be applicable to the right to 
freedom of assembly and especially the right to freedom of expression, will 
depend on the constitutional text of such a foreign country, but does not detract 
from the duty to consider such law. 
Would it be possible to have legislated for less restrictive means? Not likely, as 
section 5 ensures that the rules of natural justice, as embodied in section 33, 
must be adhered to for a lawful prohibition. The section therefore creates a 
situation where the decision by the responsible officer is substantially and 
procedurally fair. 
To summarize: 
o The objectives to be served by the Regulation of Gatherings Act, are 
sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutional right or freedom. 
The objective relates to societal concerns which are pressing and 
72 
73 
Supra n48 at 37 4J-376A. 
1994 1 BCLR 92 (8) from 99 onwards. This judgement has been described as 
a "veritable thesaurus of international authority" by Kentridge AJ in S v Zuma 
(supra n27 at 410F-G). 
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substantial and can be characterized as sufficiently important. 
o The state will be able to show that section 5 is demonstrably justified, 
especially in the light of international law and jurisprudence. The 




The measures in section 5 are fair and not arbitrary, carefully 
designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally 
connected to that question (the "causation test"74). 
The means - section 5 - impair the rights in question as little as 
possible (the "threshold test"75). 
There is proportionality between the effects of section 5 and the 
objective - the more severe the deleterious effects of the measure, 
the more important the objective must be (the "balancing test"76). 





The period from 1990 to 1994 was indeed very violent. Not only did political 
activism play a major role in this, but also state intolerance of opposing views. 
This period was a watershed, mainly because the spirit of cooperation was slowly 
starting to gain valuable ground. The philosophy of police control of crowds 
changed and started to move in a new direction. Co-ownership and co-
management of crowds were the new buzz words and the South African Police 
started concluding more agreements with organizers on public demonstrations 
and gatherings. 
Crowd management moved away from the situation where legislation shrouded 
the police and judiciary roles in political decisions. Negotiation, objective and 
reasonable exercise of discretion, with the built in safety valves, make the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act not only a leading international measure of statutory 
regulation of public protest and demonstration today, but also an important stage 
for the executive to act out its commitment to the promotion of fundamental rights 
and freedoms. 
Clearly, aspects of the Regulation of Gatherings Act restrict the already limited 
fundamental right to freedom of assembly or expression. That restriction serves 
a substantial and pressing governmental interest, namely the safety and security 
of its people. The effect of the Constitution is that such an infringement on the 
fundamental freedom of assembly or expression is interpreted restrictively. 
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Seen in this light, the limitation on the right to freedom of assembly in terms of 
section 5 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act ought to withstand the scrutiny of 
the Constitutional Court. The focus of the Act moved away from permission to 
hold a gathering to the situation where notice of an intended gathering is 
sufficient. Consequently, the fact that the Act does not expressly require 
permission is an indication that it limits the right to freedom of assembly or 
expression in a way that is reasonable and justifiable in our society. 
Because of the requirements of section 5 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 
responsible officers will have to ensure that they comply with the requirements 
for just administrative action, or see their decisions overturned on review. 
The maintenance of law and order is of crucial importance, but almost equally important are the 
methods of maintenance. 77 
77 OD Schreiner as quoted by WHB Dean in the foreword to Van der Vyver Seven 
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